Many experiments demonstrate that an individual's choice decisions are inconsistent. Following Luce [1959] and Block, Marschak, et al. [1960] , a random choice approach to this problem has become very popular. It posits the existence of a probabilistic choice function that describes the probability of choosing an alternative from a given set of options. This paper contributes to the theoretical literature that narrows the class of random choice functions. Each alternative can be fully characterized by a vector in a n-dimensional space. A decision maker pays attention only to a randomly chosen subset of coordinates (or criteria) each time he faces a set of alternatives to choose from. Given this randomly chosen subset, he is perfectly rational, that is he chooses according to some strict preference ordering. For this procedure to be well-defined, the preference ordering must be separable with respect to criteria. In other words, the preference of the decision maker over any two alternatives should not depend on the characteristics that these alternatives have in common. This paper characterizes all systems of choice probabilities that are induced by this choice procedure.
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Introduction
The problem of predicting an individual's choice has received a lot of attention from applied economists. This focus was partly motivated by the desire of producers to forecast the demand for their products; but there is a broader question of modeling individual choice. Both experimental and empirical evidence demonstrates that decisions made by an individual are inconsistent with classical utility maximization. One of the most famous of these inconsistencies is the violation of transitivity, when x is preferred to y, y is preferred to z but z is preferred to x. In the last half of the century, many models have been proposed to account for various deviations from standard utility maximization. However, empirical evidence does not give uncontroversial support to any of the existing models leaving the question of a proper characterization of individual decision making open (see, for example, McCausland and Marley [2013] for a recent empirical analysis of various choice models).
Some models (see, for example, Luce [1959] , Manzini and Mariotti [2012] ) do not assume any particular structure for the space of alternatives. In particular, they do not specify whether a decision maker is choosing over similar objects or substantially different ones. However, in empirical settings, a choice option is usually presented as a set of characteristics (see, for example, McFadden [1976] ). For example, if an individual is buying a house, she compares different houses by some criteria such as the location, the price, the number of rooms, the availability of garage and so forth. So, each house is characterized by a set of characteristics. Although appealing by their generality, these models fail to incorporate observable information about the alternatives and thus such approach is potentially inefficient. For example, following this approach, we would not be able to make any prediction about the choice between x and y based only on the choice between z and y, even if we know that x and z are very similar. Motivated by empirical needs, McFadden proposed a multinomial logit model (McFadden [1973] ) which became the first of many discrete choice models. These models adopt a random utility approach (Luce [1959] and Block, Marschak, et al. [1960] ) and assume that the probability of choice depends on observable characteristics. Although very useful in applications, most discrete choice models have been criticized for making ad hoc assumptions about the distribution of errors. This raises the need for behavioral models that are free from this issue and yet utilize the same insight of exploiting similarity structure on the space of alternatives.
The first behavioral model with attributes was proposed by Restle [1961] . Tversky [1972] generalized Restle's idea to the elimination by aspects model where he treated each alternative as a set of aspects and modeled the choice as a sequential elimination process. The idea of using multiple aspects (or rationales, or multiple selfs) has spawned a large set of papers. Most of these papers, such as Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler [2002] , Manzini and Mariotti [2007] , Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni [2012] , Apesteguia and Ballester [2013] , Ambrus and Rozen [2013] , Kőszegi and Szeidl [2013] , seek to rationalize a deterministic choice function. In contrast, Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer [2012] work with random choice function and propose a generalization of the elimination by aspect model. This paper proposes a probabilistic choice model that avoids the elimination process by incorporating two ideas -the representation of alternatives as a set of characteristics and limited attention -into a probabilistic choice model and study its implications for the random choice function.
Modeling choice inconsistency with imperfect attention has roots in psychology (Anderson [2005] ) and has recently gained popularity in economic literature. Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay [2012] and Eliaz and Spiegler [2011] work with a deterministic choice function. Manzini and Mariotti [2012] and Matejka and McKay [2011] model limited attention in the frame of probabilistic choice. The model by Manzini and Mariotti [2012] is especially close to the one proposed in this paper. The main difference is that in my model, instead of stochastically choosing a subset of alternatives to consider, the individual randomly picks a subset of characteristics (or criteria). For example, comparing house x and house y, a buyer compares based only on price and location in thirty percent of the time and based only on price and the number of rooms in seventy percent of the time.
The model presented here is called a random criteria rule and implies the following algorithm for the decision making process. Suppose each alternative is represented by a vector in finite-dimensional space. Each coordinate of such vector characterizes the alternative according to some criterion. Given this structure of the space of alternatives, an individual is paying attention only to a randomly chosen subset of criteria each time he faces a set of alternatives to choose from. Given this randomly chosen subset, he is perfectly rational, that is, he chooses according to some preference ordering. Here, a perceptive reader will immediately notice that the preference ordering should be defined not only on the original space of alternatives -as it is usually the case -but also on the space of projections of the alternatives onto various subsets of criteria. One way to define such preference ordering is to define a separable preference ordering on the original space of alternatives and then extend it to the projections. A preference ordering is separable if the ordering of any two alternatives is independent of the values of characteristics that they share. In other words, the preferences over different criteria are independent and therefore, as long as the values according to a certain criterion are the same for both alternatives, the individual does not care about this value in his choice process. The advantage of separability is that the induced ordering on any group of criteria is independent of whatever fixed valued we attach to the remaining ones: after choosing the subset of criteria to consider, the individual assumes that alternatives cannot be distinguished by the other criteria and applies the separable preference ordering to the set of modified alternatives on the original space to find the best option.
In Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this paper, I assume the choice of criteria to consider is characterized by a menu independent attention function, that is, the individual chooses any given subset of criteria with the same probability across all possible choice sets. Formally, the attention function is a probability distribution over the set of all subsets of criteria. Section 7 considers a general case when an attention function is menu-dependent. Formally, the attention function is a function of two arguments, a subset of criteria and a choice set; for each choice set, the attention function is a probability distribution over the set of all subsets of criteria.
The main result of Section 3 is the characterization theorem (Theorem 1) for binary choice probabilities that are induced by the choice procedure described above. This theorem states that if a set of binary choices is rich enough then there exist a separable strict preference ordering on the space of alternatives and an attention function that characterizes a random choice rule if and only if this rule satisfies two axioms. Theorem 2 adds that if exist, both the preference ordering and the attention function are uniquely identified (up to the preferences over some fixed pair of alternatives). Axiom 1 guarantees the separability of preferences, whereas Axiom 2 essentially provides an algorithm to construct the preferences and the attention function.
Section 4 shows that the random criteria rule is a special case of a random utility model and gives the characterization of the proposed model in a general case through a modification of McFadden and Richter [1990] 's Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences that characterizes the set of random utility models (Theorem 5). While this result is completely general (up to the restriction to menu independent attention functions), it is not very useful for binary choice case. Citing McFadden [2005] , "it does not fully exploit the geometry of the polytope containing the vectors of rationalizable choice probabilities". Theorem 1 solves this problem.
Similar to Section 4, Section 5 also illuminates the connection between the proposed model and the class of random utility models. However, in contrast to Section 4 where this connection is drawn through the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences, Section 5 exploits earlier works by Falmagne [1978] and Barberá and Pattanaik [1986] that characterizes the random utility model by means of the Block-Marschak polynomials. This characterization was given under the assumption that the set of menus is rich enough and thus cannot not be applied in general case (in particular, it is not applicable for binary choice probabilities). However, the advantage of the Falmagne [1978] 's characterization is that it gives a direct construction of the primitives of a random utility model that corresponds to a given random choice function. Section 5 gives several ways to use the Block-Marschak polynomials to characterize the proposed model with imperfect attention. In particular, Theorem 7 describes the random criteria rule using both the Block-Marschak polynomials and another modification of the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences. Theorem 8 gives a characterization of the random criteria rule through the Block-Marschak polynomials only but under additional restriction that all options in each menu are different from each other by every attribute. Theorem 9 gives another characterization of the random criteria rule through the Block-Marschak polynomials but under a different restriction of the set of menus.
Section 6 discusses different properties of the random criteria rule. In particular, Lemma 4 states that any random criteria rule satisfies regularity condition, that is the addition of an option to a choice set does not increase the probability of selecting an option from the original set. Example 1 shows that some random choice rules violate weak stochastic transitivity property whereas Example 2 demonstrates a famous Debreu [1960] 's red bus/blue bus effect in context of the proposed choice procedure.
Random Criteria Rule
There is a nonempty finite set of alternatives (options) X = n i=1 X i and a domain D of subsets (the menus) of X. Each element of X is a vector of n attributes (characteristics), and X i is the set of possible values of attribute i 1 . For example, X is a set of houses and each of them can be described by the number of rooms, location, and price. I assume that neither of two houses are alike, that is no two houses have the same location, the number of rooms and price. In practice, if there are indeed two houses with the same characteristics, we might say that they are indistinguishable by any means and therefore can be treated as one choice option. In other words, this assumption tells that the set of attributes fully characterizes an alternative.
Next, consider an individual who wants to buy a house 2 . Suppose there are several web sites that sell houses. Each time the individual open one of these web sites, she chooses one of the houses offered by that web site. In that case, each element in D is a set of houses offered by one of the web sites. In other words, D is a set of menus from which the individual makes a choice.
The decision maker has a total ordering on X that reflects her preferences over X. Continuing with the example, if the individual thinks that house a is at least as good as house b, then we say that a b.
Let the set of attributes be N = {1, . . . , n}. Denote by P(N) the set of all nonempty subsets of N. This is all possible combinations of criteria the decision maker can pay attention to. For any x, y ∈ X, s ∈ P(N), denote (x s , y −s ) an element z in X such that z i = x i if i ∈ s and z i = y i if i s.
Assumption 1 (Separability) For any i ∈ N, for any x, y ∈ X, z, v ∈ X i :
The separability assumption means that the preferences over any two alternatives does not depend on the attributes common to both options. This assumption is equivalent to additive separability of a utility representation of (see for the proof).
To illustrate the separability assumption, consider four houses, a, b,ã, andb. Suppose houses a and b are in Arizona, whereas housesã andb are in California. Houses a andã have 2 rooms each and they both have the same price $500,000. Houses b andb have 3 rooms each and they both have the same price $800,000. If the individual prefers house a to house b then the separability assumption requires her to prefer houseã to houseb.
Given this assumption, I can define a set of preferences { s } s∈P(N) on X derived from the original preference ordering :
Definition 1 Suppose a total order on X satisfies assumption 1. For any s ∈ P(N), a binary relation s on X is said to be derived from if for any x, y ∈ X,
Since is separable, the binary relation s is complete for any s ∈ P(N). Transitivity of ensures transitivity of all s , s ∈ P(S ). Therefore, s is a transitive and complete binary relation.
Returning to the example, suppose the individual prefers house a with 2 rooms and price $500,000 to house b with 3 rooms and price $800,000. Recall that both houses have the same location. Then the individual is indifferent between these two houses according to preferences location . However, she strictly prefers house a to house b according to price, # of rooms . Assuming that she would rather have house with more rooms and with lower price, we can state that she strictly prefers a to b according to price The interpretation of p(a, A) is that it is the probability that the decision maker chooses a ∈ A from A. p(·, ·) is also called a probabilistic choice function.
For example, let A be a set of houses offered by a web site. Suppose we know that while visiting this web site, the individual chose one house among this set. Then for any house a among this set, p(a, A) denotes the probability the individual chose house a.
Definition 3 An attention function is a map γ :
The interpretation of γ(s) is that it is the probability that the agent considers a nonempty subset s ∈ P(N) of criteria while reflecting on what to choose. In other words, γ is a probability distribution over P(N). Note that so defined attention function is independent of choice set. A menu-dependent attention function γ :
In the example, the set of all nonempty subsets of N, P(N), consists of all possible combinations of price, # of rooms, and location. One possible attention function is γ({price}) = 1/2, γ({price, # of rooms, location}) = 1/4, γ({price, location}) = 1/8, γ({# of rooms, location}) = 1/16, γ({location}) = 1/16, γ(s) = 0 otherwise. That is, with probability 1/2 the individual is paying attention to only price, with probability 1/4 she is paying attention to all three attributes together, and so forth.
A random choice rule proposed in this paper assumes that the agent randomly chooses a subset s ∈ P(N) of criteria to consider, according to the distribution γ. Then she applies the induced ordering s to a choice set to pick s -best alternative, with equal-probability tiebreaking rule.
Definition 4 A random criteria rule is a random choice rule p ,γ for which there exists a pair ( , γ), where is a total order on X that satisfies Assumption 1, and γ is a map γ :
where the preferences { s } s∈P(N) on X are derived from .
To illustrate this rule, consider the same example as before. Recall that the individual prefers house a with 2 rooms and price $500,000 to house b with 3 rooms and price $800,000. The attention function is as defined above. Then (1) half of the time she pays attention only to price and chooses a, (2) a quarter of the time she pays attention to all three criteria and chooses a, (3) with probability 1/8 she pays attention to price and location and chooses a, (4) with probability 1/16 she pays attention to the number of rooms and location and chooses b, (5) with probability 1/16 she pays attention to location only and tosses a fair coin to choose. To sum up, the probability of choosing a is 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/2 · 1/16, that is p(a, {a, b}) = 29/32 (the probability of choosing b is p(b, {a, b}) = 1/16 + 1/2 · 1/16 = 3/32 = 1 − p(a, {a, b})).
Characterization for Binary Choices
Suppose we observe a random choice function p over set of menus D. When can we identify that this function is a random criteria rule? This section shows that we can do it in a special case when the decision maker has a strict preference ordering on X and confronts to all possible binary choice sets, that is, when D is all subsets of size 2.
So, in this section we assume that
(2) is a strict preference order, that is if a b and b a then a = b.
The last assumption says that for any two houses that differ from each other along at least one attribute, the individual strictly prefers one over another. This assumption is common in literature 3 . Moreover, it is not very restrictive in practice when X is finite 4 . I will need this assumption to be able unambiguously attribute any indifference in preferences to the case when the agent pays attention only to attributes that are common for alternatives under consideration. For example, consider two houses, a and b, that have the same price and the number of rooms but different locations. If the agent chooses each of the houses from menu {a, b} with equal probability, then we can say that she shows indifference between these two houses. Since these houses are different in location and her preference ordering is strict, we can deduce that she pays no attention to location.
The main idea can be illustrated with our familiar example of houses. Suppose the individual's random choice function is indeed a random criteria rule. How can we construct a preference ordering and an attention function γ that correspond to the observed choice function?
Suppose houses a and b differ with respect to only one characteristics. Then two cases are possible: either the decision maker chooses both options with equal probability, or she prefers one of them more often than another. If the individual picks a more often than b, than she must prefer a over b with respect to her preference ordering . Moreover, the extent to with she chooses a more often than b indicates the amount of attention paid to the characteristic that differ between these two houses. If the decision maker is equally likely to choose any of these houses, all we can say is that she does not pay attention to the characteristic. In that case, her preferences over a and b is undefined.
Suppose houses a and b differ with respect to exactly two characteristics. This case is more tricky than the previous one. Suppose the decision maker chooses both houses equally often. In contrast to the case of only one different attribute, now we cannot infer with certainty that she does not pay attention to these pair of attributes at all. She might prefer a over b based on one of these attributes and b over a based on another one. In that case, she must be equally likely to pay attention to each of these characteristics separately and never take both of them simultaneously into account. This includes the case of no attention to any of these attributes but it also allows for other possibilities. That is the point at which the algorithm becomes nontrivial. Detailed description of this algorithm is presented in Section 3.2.
Three important things are worth mentioning here. First of all, by comparing houses with only one different attribute, we can find the probability that the decision maker pays attention to this attribute, but we are not able to infer the amount of attention paid to this attribute only.
Similarly, choices over alternatives that are different with respect to a subset s of criteria give us the amount of attention paid to s, that is the probability that the decision maker pays attention to a subset of attributes that contains s. Therefore, we need to distinguish "the probability that the decision maker pays attention to a subset of attributes that contains s" and "the probability that the decision maker pays attention to a subset s of attributes only". Section 3.1 shows how to convert one to other.
Second, while it does not matter which characteristic we start with, it is important to apply the procedure first for all houses that differ with respect to only one attribute, then with respect to only two attributes, and so on. The reason is that when applying the procedure for houses that are different based on a subset s ∈ P(N) of criteria, we infer the preferences over these houses and the amount of attention paid to s using (1) the preferences s based on all possible strict subsets s of s, and (2) the amount of attention paid to all possible strict subsets s of s. These amounts and preferences s are inferred on previous steps of the algorithm. For example, suppose houses a and b have the same price but a is in California and has two rooms whereas b is in Mississippi and has three rooms. To infer the preferences over these houses, we need to know what the individual would prefer if she pays attention to price but not to location and vice versa. Suppose she prefers a house in California to a house in Mississippi, ceteris paribus, and a house with three rooms to a house with two rooms (again, ceteris paribus, that is, given the same location and price). Given the difference in the probability of choosing one house over another if they are different in only one attribute, we compute the amount of attention paid to location / the number of rooms. Applying the result on Section 3.1, we can calculate the extent by with the decision maker would choose a more often than b if she never paid attention to both location and the number of rooms 5 : γ(location)+γ(location, price)−γ(rooms)−γ(rooms, price). If it occurs that a is chosen more often than predicted by this calculations, then a is preferred to b. If a is chosen less often, then b is preferred to a. If the prediction is correct, then the decision maker does not pay attention the number of rooms and location together and therefore her preferences over a and b cannot be inferred.
Finally, as demonstrated by the example above, the inferred preference ordering and attention function might not be unique. Even if the decision maker chooses one alternative more often than another for each pair of alternatives, that is, she pays attention to all attributes, it is still possible to get multiple solution to this problem. The basic intuition for this is that for each subset s of characteristics the number of "unknowns" is greater by one than the number of equations: for each pair of alternatives, we observe how often the individual chooses one over another and write one equation; as for "unknowns", they are the preferences over all these pairs plus the amount of attention paid to s. The question of when the preference ordering and the attention function is uniquely identifiable from a random criteria rule is addressed in section 3.3.
So, we know how to construct a preference ordering and an attention function, given a random criteria rule. Now let's return to the original question. When can we identify that a given random choice function is a random criteria rule? Let's take a random choice function and try to construct a preference ordering and an attention function as if it is a random choice rule. If at some point of our procedure we end up with a contradiction, this random choice function is not a random criteria rule.
Inversion Lemma
The following Inversion Lemma is essentially a variation of Möbius Inversion, so called the basic Inclusion-Exclusion Principle (e.g., Bender and Goldman [1975] ).
Lemma 1 Consider two maps: γ : P(N) → R and a :
For the proof see Appendix A.
When γ is an attention function, that is, γ(s) is the probability that the decision maker pays attention to a subset s of criteria only,
has an interpretation as the probability that the decision maker pays attention to a subset of attributes that contains s.
This lemma shows how to convert an attention function γ to a function a and vice versa. It is the basis for the proof of the characterization theorem 1.
Characterization Theorem
Following conventional notation for a binary random choice function, for the rest of section 3 I denote the probability of choosing x when facing x and y by p(x, y) ≡ p(x, {x, y}).
The first axiom guarantees the separability of preferences. It states that the random choice function does not depend on characteristics that are common for both alternatives.
Axiom 1 (Independence) For any s ∈ P(N), for any x, y, z, v ∈ X:
The second axiom requires the existence of a strict separable preference order and a function a : P(N) → R that satisfy two conditions. The constants {a(s)} have the meaning of the probabilities that the decision maker pays attention to a subset of attributes. Therefore, given the Inversion Lemma 1, the corresponded function γ : P(N) → R must be an attention function. This gives the first condition. The second condition links together the observed probabilities p, the preference order and the function a.
Axiom 2 There exist a function a : P(N) → R and a strict preference ordering on X that satisfies Assumption 1, such that
s ⊇s (−1) |s |−|s| a(s ) ≤ 1, for all s ∈ P(N), and
2. For any x, y, z ∈ X:
where s * = {i : x i y i }.
To provide intuition for condition (2), it is convenient to rewrite it in the following form:
The difference in probabilities p(x, y) − p(y, x) can be interpreted as the amount by which x is better than y. The difference 1 (x y) − 1 (y x) is the advantage of x based on all attributes. If the decision maker always paid attention to all attributes, than p(x, y) − p(y, x) would be equal to 1 (x y) − 1 (y x). Thus, this representation can be treated as repression of p(x, y) − p(y, x) on 1 (x y) − 1 (y x). For high attention paid to all relevant attributes, that is for big a(s * ), term 1 (x y) − 1 (y x) has high explanatory power. The second term can be treated as the regression error, or loss from imperfect attention.
Condition (2) can be also interpreted from a different perspective:
∆(x, y) is a "residual" from "regressing" observable advantage of x, p(x, y) − p(y, x), to the preference indicator, 1 (x y) − 1 (y x) (which is equal to 1 if x is indeed better than y and -1 otherwise). Similarly, ∆ s (x, y) is a "residual" from "regressing" observable advantage of x based on the subset s of attributes, to the preferences over these attributes.
Condition (2) gives an algorithm to construct a preference order and a function a. Fix any i ∈ N. Take any x, y ∈ X such that s * = {i : x i y i } = {i}. Then the difference p(x, y) − p(y, x) gives a({i}) and i . Do it for all i ∈ N. Then fix any i j ∈ N. Take any x, y ∈ X such that s * = {i, j}. The left side of (2) is known (it does not depend on z by Axiom 1). The right side of (2) is known up to s * and a(s * ). Take all other x, y ∈ X such that s * = {i, j} to construct a system of equations for s * and a s * . Using the constraint 0 < a(s * ) < min{a({i}), a({ j})} (recall the interpretation of a(s) as the probability that the individual pays attention to some s ⊇ s), find all possible solutions for this system of equations (the number of equations is one less than the number of "unknowns"). For each solution continue the algorithm for other s * . Finally, apply the Inversion Lemma to convert a to γ.
Theorem 1 shows that axioms 1 and 2 are necessary and sufficient for the choice function to be a random criteria rule. Thus, if at some point of the algorithm we end up with a contradiction, the random choice function is not a random criteria rule.
A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule p ,γ if and only if it satisfies Axiom 1 and Axiom 2.
For the proof see Appendix B.
Uniqueness
Consider a random choice rule p for which both axioms, 1 and 2, are satisfied. By theorem 1, p is a random criteria rule, that is, there exists a separable strict total order on X and an attention function γ such that p = p ,γ . When are and γ uniquely identified from a given choice function p? Theorem 2 answers this question.
Theorem 2 Let |X i | > 1 and D = {A ⊆ X | |A| = 2}. Let p ,γ and p ,γ be two random choice rules such that
(ii) there existx,ỹ ∈ X,x i ỹ i for all i ∈ N, such that for all s ∈ P(N),x sỹ if and only if x sỹ , and
for all s ∈ P(N), and (II) for any x, y ∈ X, x y if and only if x y.
For the proof see Appendix C.
Theorem 2 exploits Axiom 2, in particular condition (2) that provides an algorithm to construct a preference order and a function a (using lemma 1, γ can be obtained from a uniquely). Theorem 2 states that the algorithm gives a unique solution up to the preferences over one pair of alternatives (condition (ii)), provided that all attributes are relevant (condition (iii)). Conditions (i) and (ii) guarantee (I): condition (2) applied tox andỹ gives a. Condition (iii) tells that any subset of attributes has nonzero probability to be in attention focus (which is equivalent to saying that there is a nonzero probability that the decision maker pays attention to all attributes). This guarantees that all a(s) > 0 in (2). Together with (I), this gives (II).
Theorem 2 states that if conditions (ii) and (iii) hold, the random criteria rule representation is unique. These conditions are not very restrictive. Condition (iii) simply requires the individual to pay attention to all attributes at least occasionally (that is, with nonzero probability). This assumption is reasonable when (1) the number of attributes is not too large for the individual to take them all into account simultaneously, and (2) the attributes are relevant to the decision, that is, each attribute potentially has influence on the final choice. Condition (ii) is a bit more restrictive. It requires the econometrician to know the preferences over a pair of alternatives in advance, before looking at the choices made by the individual. Although strictly speaking it generates 2 2 n −1 degrees of freedom, in many situations there might be a pair for which the set of preferences can be induced unambiguously from some external reasoning. For example, consider the decision maker choosing houses. The set of criteria, as before, price, the number of rooms, and location. It might be pretty safe to assume that a house a with five rooms for $400,000, located in California, is a better option than house b with one room in Mississsippi for $800,000. Moreover, if we know a priori that the preferences over each criteria separately are monotone (like it is the case for price) then there is always a pair of alternatives with one Pareto dominating the other. In this case, condition (ii) satisfies automatically.
Two additional comments are worth mentioning about the uniqueness result. First, the pair {x,ỹ} has a nice interpretation of a fixed point for the procedure that retrieves the preference order and the attention function. Fixing the preferences over this pair, we can uniquely identify the preference order for all other alternatives and the attention function. Second, condition (ii) is sufficient but not necessary. For some random functions it might be the case that (i) and (iii) ensure the uniqueness. Moreover, the requirement of knowing in advance the preferences { s } over the same pair of alternatives can be relaxed. It is sufficient to know the preferences { s } over pairs {x (s) ,ỹ (s) } respectively, where for each s,x
What is more, it is sufficient to know preferences only for s such that 1 < |s| < n. For the proof see Appendix C.
Characterization for General Case
Section 3 provides the characterization for the case when any choice set consists of only two alternatives. This characterization is essentially an algorithm to reconstruct the preference relation and the attention function. The algorithm is based on the induction by the number of characteristics that two compared alternatives share (the induction starts with n − 1 common characteristics and goes down to 0). However, Definition 4 was given for a general case when the size of a choice set is unrestricted. This section considers this general case. Unlike binary choice, the algorithm implied by the characterization in general case is not so simple. This characterization is heavily based on McFadden and Richter's characterization of the set of random choice functions consistent with a random utility model (McFadden and Richter [1990] , McFadden [2005] ). Therefore, I start with section 4.1 that establishes a tight connection between the model of random criteria rule and the class of random utility models. Section 4.2 contains the characterization theorem. This theorem describes the random criteria rule in three alternative ways: (1) using the notion of pseudoinverse matrix, (2) through a linear program, (3) through a modified Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences introduced by McFadden and Richter [1990] . The first two characterizations correspond to finite algorithms to retrieve an attention function and preference ordering from choice data, given that this data is consistent with the random criteria rule. Both algorithms can be described as a cycle over all possible separable total orderings. The difference is in the body of the cycle. The first algorithm is based of the solution of a system of linear equations, where the number of equations is not necessarily equal to the number of unknowns. The second algorithm shows that instead of solving the system of equations one can solve a linear program.
Random Criteria Rule and Random Utility Model
A random utility model states the existence of a probability space (U, U, ν) of utility functions, U = {u : X → R}, such that a random choice function p(a, A) is equal to the probability that a utility ranks a above all options in A (with equal split in case of indifference). The first formal definition of the random utility model (RUM) was given by Block, Marschak, et al. [1960] .
The model of random criteria rule belongs to the class of random utility models. Indeed, the set of utilities corresponds to the set of preferences { s } s∈P(N) , with the measure on it given by the attention function. In fact, we can say more: the set of random criteria rules is equivalent to the set of random utility models with separable utilities.
Theorem 3 For any random criteria rule p ,γ , there exists a set of functions u i : X i → R, i = 1, . . . , n, such that p ,γ is consistent with the random utility model (U, U, ν), where U = {u s |s ∈ P(N)}, u s (x) = i∈s u i (x i ), U is the set of all subsets of U, ν(u s ) = γ(s). The converse is also true: for any set of functions u i : X i → R, i = 1, . . . , n, and any probability distribution ν on P(N), there exists a random criteria rule p ,γ such that it is consistent with the random utility model (U, U, ν), where U = {u s |s ∈ P(N)}, u s (x) = i∈s u i (x i ), U is the set of all subsets of U, ν(u s ) = γ(s).
Proof : Function u : X → R is additively separable if it has the form u(x) = n i=1 u i (x i ). Debreu et al. [1960] proved that Assumption 1 for on X is necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an additively separable representation of .
Characterization Theorem
To separate my results from the existing ones, I start with the formulation of McFadden and Richter's characterization theorem for random utility models. Let X be finite, U be the class of utility functions that totally order X (ties possible), D be a family of non-empty subsets of X, and p be a random choice function defined on X × D. For a trial (x, B) with x ∈ B ∈ D and for u ∈ U, define
Form a column vector π composed of subvectors for each B ∈ D, with each subvector composed of the choice probabilities p(x, B) for x ∈ B. Form the matrix A with element a x,B,u in the row corresponding to the trial (x, B)and column u for u ∈ U.
Theorem 4 (McFadden [2005] 6 , p.252) The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) There exists a probability ν on U that rationalizes the choice probability; i.e., (r π − t) subject to 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, t ≥ 0, and r A ≤ t1 has no positive solution.
(e) The choice probabilities p(x, B), x ∈ B ∈ D, satisfy the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences: for each finite sequence {(
arg max
Given Theorem 3, there are two ways to translate McFadden's result to the random criteria rule -through separable preferences directly and through separable utilities.
Before formulating the results, I introduce some notations. For a set of utilities {u i :
, for a trial (x, B) with x ∈ B ∈ D and for s ∈ P(N), define
Similarly, for a separable preference order on X, for a trial (x, B) with x ∈ B ∈ D and for s ∈ P(N), define a x,B,s, = 1 (x s x , ∀x ∈ B) |{b ∈ B i : b s x , ∀x ∈ B}| The notation for π has exactly the same meaning as in Theorem 4. By γ I denote a vector of γ(s) for all s ∈ P(N). Matrices
and A are composed with elements a x,B,s,{u i } n i=1
and a x,B,s, respectively. A + denote Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse matrix.
where inf is taken over all possible sets of utility functions defined on X j , and sup is taken over all possible finite sequences {(
where inf is taken over all possible total orderings on X that satisfy Assumption 1, and sup is taken over all possible finite sequences {(
Theorem 5 The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) A random choice function p is a random criteria rule.
(b:2:u) There exist a set of utilities {u i : X i → R} n i=1 such that the system A {u i } n i=1 γ = π, γ ≥ 0, has a solution.
(b:2: ) There exists a separable preference ordering on X such that the system A γ = π, γ ≥ 0, has a solution.
(b:3:u) There exist a set of utilities {u i : X i → R} n i=1 and a vector w such that 
γ + s ≥ π, 1 γ ≤ 1 has an optimal solution with s = 0. 2. If the system π = Aγ has any solution, they are all given by γ = A + π + (I − A + A)w for arbitrary vector w.
This proves (b:3). All the rest is a straightforward corollary of Theorem 4.
Conditions (b:1:u) -(c: ) are based on a direct construction of preferences and an attention function. They are all implied the following algorithm: for each separable preference ordering, find a proper attention function (if possible). One can combine these characterizations by using different methods of finding an attention function for different preferences. The choice among (b:1:u) -(c: ) is dictated by computational considerations (sometimes it is easier to solve a linear program than compute a pseudoinverse matrix or vice versa) and no general advice can be given.
Conditions (e:u) and (e: ) characterize the random criteria rule through a modification of the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences. It says that there exists separable preferences such that the sum of choice probabilities over a finite set of trials is no larger than the maximal sum of choice probabilities rationalized by the preferences over some subset of criteria. Although appealing by its intuitive formulation, conditions (e:u) and (e: ) do not give a finite algorithm to whether a random choice function is a random criteria rule. These conditions are convenient for rejecting preferences for which there is no proper attention function since they do not involve either the solution of a system of equations or the optimization problem. However, the implied algorithm is potentially infinite for each preference ordering since the number of all possible finite sequences {(x i , B i )} In an arbitrary small neighborhood of r, there existsr whose components are all rational numbers. Clear a common denominator so thatr is a vector of non-negative integers. Each coordinate of this vector corresponds to a trial (x, B), and the value of the coordinate tells how many times the trial should be taken in {(
Half of the conditions in Theorem 5 requires to a cycle over a set of separable preferences and the other half corresponds to a cycle over a set of utility functions. Note that the latter case does not imply an infinite cycle since we only care about ordinal preferences over X, and in that sense both representations are essentially identical.
To sum up, Theorem 5 provides a tool to determine whether a given random choice function is a random criteria rule, and if it is, to construct all possible preferences and corresponding attention functions. However, the implied algorithm is rather complicated computationally. Section 3 gave a simpler algorithm for binary case. The next section consider another special case where a computationally simpler rule can be derived.
Characterization for Exhaustive Menus
Section 5 gives a general characterization of the set of random choice functions that can be described as a random criteria rule. However, the downside of generality is that the implied algorithm might be computationally very burdensome in some cases. This section provide an alternative characterization for a special case when the set of menus D is exhaustive, that is, any subset of A∈D A belongs to D. This characterization is also based on the representation of the random criteria rule as a random utility model. However, it exploits a different characterization of random utility models which is based on the Block-Marschak polynomials (Falmagne [1978] , Barberá and Pattanaik [1986] , McFadden [2005] ). The restriction to exhaustiveness comes from the fact that it is impossible to construct the full set of Block-Marschak polynomials without this condition 7 .
Definition 5 A set of menus D is exhaustive if
Note that this assumption exclude a binary choice case discussed in Section 3.
For the rest of the section suppose D is exhaustive. Denote X = A∈D A.
Definition 6 For any A ⊂ X and for any x ∈ X \ A, the Block-Marschak polynomial K x,A is the function
K x,A is the probability of the event that x is ranked behind the elements of A and ahead of all the remaining elements in X ⊆ A (Barberá and Pattanaik [1986] ).
Let U be the class of all possible utility functions that totally order X (ties are not allowed) and p be a random choice function defined on X × D.
Theorem 6 (Falmagne [1978] , Theorem 4) The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) There exists a probability ν on U that rationalizes the choice probability; i.e.,
(b) The Block-Marschak polynomials K x,X\B for x ∈ B ∈ D, are non-negative.
Unlike Theorem 4, this result cannot be applied directly for the random criteria rule since it requires the exhaustive set of preferences whereas the random criteria rule is restricted to a separable preference orderings. However, the proof of Theorem 6 gives a clue how to use the Block-Marschak polynomials in our case.
The key idea of the proof is to construct a measure ν on the set of all preference orderings on X. Following Falmagne [1978] , for any A ⊆ X, denote by Π A the set of all |A|! strict orderings 7 McFadden [2005] gives the characterization through the Block-Marschak polynomials under a milder restriction on D: D must form a net, that is for any feasible menu, every larger menu is also feasible. However, the constructed measure on the set of preference orderings is not unique in that case. I discuss the extension of my results to this case at the end of this section. on A. For A = {a 1 , . . . , a k }, an element of Π A is π =< a 1 , . . . , a k > meaning that a 1 . . . a k . For any A ⊆ B ⊂ X and any π A ∈ Π A , let S π A ,B be a set of orderings on B that coincide with π A on A and rank all elements in A higher than any remaining elements in B:
S <a 1 ,...,a k >,B = {π ∈ Π B : a 1 . . . a k x ∀x ∈ B \ A} Denote T 0 = {S π,X | π ∈ Π B for some B ⊆ X}. Then construct a set-valued function ν on T 0 in the following way:
1. For any x ∈ X, ν(S <x>,X ) = K x,∅ .
2. For any x, y ∈ X, x y, ν(S <y,x>,X ) = K x,{y} .
3. Suppose ν has been defined for S π,X with π ∈ Π B for all B ⊆ X such that |B| < k. Take any B such that |B| = k − 1 and define ∆ B = π∈Π B ν(S π,X ) with the interpretation of the probability to rank all alternatives in B first. Then, for any π B ∈ Π B and for any x ∈ X \ B, define
This formula has the following intuitive interpretation. Let A be the event that all alternatives in B are ranked according to π B and above x whereas all remaining options are ranked below x; let B be the event that all alternatives in B are ranked above x whereas all remaining options are ranked below x. Note that A ⊆ B. Then Probability(A) = Probability(B)Probability(A|B). Note also that Probability(A|B) is equal to the probability that all alternatives in B are ranked according to π B and above all remaining options (event E) conditional on the event F that all elements in B are ranked above the rest, that is, Probability(A|B) = Probability(E|F ). Moreover, Probability(E|F ) = Probability(E)/Probability(F ). We have Probability(A) = ν(S <π B ,x>,X ), Probability(B) = K x,B , Probability(E) = ν(S π B ,X ), Probability(F ) = ∆ B . This gives us formula (3).
This construction gives a uniquely defined probability measure ν on the set of all strict preference orderings on X:
Falmagne [1978] showed that this measure rationalizes the random choice function which completes the proof of Theorem 6.
To characterize random criteria rule, we need one more step: convert the measure ν to a probability measure γ on a set of preferences { s } s∈P(N) on X for every separable preference ordering on X 8 . Fix any separable preference ordering on X. Let { s } s∈P(N) be the preferences on X that are derived from . For each π =< x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (|X|) >∈ Π X , we say
Recall that the separability property of a preference ordering is defined under the condition that this ordering is defined on the whole set of options X (see Assumption 1)
Recall that by Definition 4, a random choice function p is a random criteria rule with separable preference ordering and attention function γ if
Note the similarity between these two formulas, (4) and (5). Exploiting this similarity, we are going to apply the same technique as in Section 4.
For any π ∈ Π X and any s ∈ P(N), denote
Let matrix A be composed with elements a π,s, and denote ν and γ the column vectors of ν (π) and γ(s) respectively. Then the system of equations (4) This is an analog to (b:1: ) of Theorem 5. All other statements in Theorem 5 can also be rewritten in terms of ν. In particular, the characterization through the modification of the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences:
where inf is taken over all possible total orderings on X that satisfy Assumption 1, and sup is taken over all possible finite sequences
Theorem 7 Let D be exhaustive. A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule if and only if all Block-Marschak polynomials are non-negative and measure ν derived from these polynomials satisfies Axiom 5.
This theorem provides an alternative characterization for the random criteria rule when D is exhaustive. In general, I cannot tell that this characterization is unambiguously simpler or harder than the one in Theorem 5. However, the technique presented here can indeed simplify the characterization for two special cases that I discuss below.
Characterization for Exclusively Exhaustive Menus
Definition 7 A set of menus D is exclusively exhaustive if it is exhaustive and ∀x, y ∈ X, x y ⇒ x i y i ∀i = 1, . . . , n, where X = A∈D A.
In words, an exhaustive set of menus is exclusively exhaustive if any two options in any menu differ with respect to every attribute.
In that case for any separable strict total order on X and for any s ∈ P(N), we have
that is, any preferences s can "rationalize" at most one strict ordering on X. Moreover, any set of |P(N)| = 2 n − 1 strict total orderings on X can be "rationalized" by some separable strict total order on X. Note also that ν(π =< x
(1) , . . . , x (|X|) >) > 0 if and only if the ordering π is "admissible" by Block-Marschak polynomials, that is,
These three observations give us the following theorem:
Theorem 8 Let D be exclusively exhaustive. A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule p ,γ if and only if all Block-Marschak polynomials K x,A , A ⊂ X, x ∈ X \ A, are non-negative and |R| ≤ 2 n − 1 where
that is, R is the set of orderings that are admissible by Block-Marschak polynomials.
For the proof see Appendix D.
Note that this theorem characterizes the random criteria rule under two restrictions:
1. D is exclusively exhaustive, and 2. a separable total ordering on X is strict.
Both of them play important role in the proof. Specifically, we need both conditions to show that all preference orderings s are strict on X. This fact is a key point in the proof.
It is important to understand that Theorem 8 implies the following simple algorithm to construct both separable preferences and an attention function.
1. Construct the Block-Marschak polynomials using Definition 6. K x,A , A ⊂ X, x ∈ X \ A.
Check if they are all non-negative. If not, p is not a random criteria rule.
2. Construct a set-valued function ν on T 0 using recursive formula (3).
3. Let R = {π ∈ Π X : ν (π) > 0}. Check if |R| ≤ 2 n − 1. If not, p is not a random criteria rule.
4. Choose any S ⊆ P(N) such that |S | = |R|. Take any one-to-one function r : S → R. For each s ∈ S set s be r(s) on X. Complete the construction of the preferences so that all { s } s∈P(N) defined on X are derived from some separable strict preference ordering on X. For each s ∈ P(N) set γ(s) = ν (r(s)) if s ∈ S and otherwise γ(s) = 0.
Note that the last step illuminates the question of uniqueness of the and γ: γ is unique up to permutations of s, and { s } are unique on X up to permutations of s.
Characterization for Completely Exhaustive Menus
Definition 8 A set of menus D is completely exhaustive if it is exhaustive and
In words, an exhaustive set of menus is completely exhaustive if it includes all alternatives in X.
In this case one can apply Theorem 1 to check whether p is a random criteria rule defined only on binary menus and if yes, construct a preference ordering and an attention function. Then check the definition of random criteria rule for the rest of menus. This subsection discusses an alternative algorithm which is based on the Block-Marschak polynomials. I do not claim that the characterization presented here is computationally unambiguously easier or harder. However, one clear advantage of this characterization is that it can be generalized to the case when D forms a net (see Section 5.3).
Note also that when D is completely exhaustive one can apply Theorem 8 to get a set of necessary conditions: for any exclusively exhaustive subset of D, p must be a random criteria rule.
So, suppose D is completely exhaustive. Fix any strict separable preference ordering on X. Recall that according to formula (4), we have
Note that |{π ∈ Π X : π ∈ s }| = i s
does not depend on the chosen order 9 .
Definition 9 Say π ∈ Π X respects s ∈ P(N) if ∀x, y ∈ X, x s y s , x π y ⇒ x π y , ∀x , y ∈ X such that x s = x s , y s = y s
Note that π ∈ s only if it respects s. Note also that any π ∈ Π X respects N.
Lemma 2 If |X i | ≥ 2 for all i = 1, . . . , n, then
For the proof see Appendix E. Note that the proof for point 2 is constructive.
Given Lemma 2, formula (6) leads to
Given a set of orders
, we can solve for a(s):
Unrolling the recursion, we get
with the interpretation of the number of "paths" from s to s .
Axiom 6 There exists a separable strict preference ordering such that for any function
we have
where
Given the above construction, we can see that the following statement is true:
Lemma 3 Let ν be a probability measure on Π X . Then for any given separable strict total order on X, if (8) is true for some function ρ that satisfies condition (7), it is also true for all functions ρ such that (7) holds.
This lemma tells that it is sufficient to check condition (8) only for some arbitrary function ρ that satisfies condition (7). Indeed, if (8) is true for some function ρ then there exists a function γ such that (6) holds, and therefore (8) satisfies for any ρ.
Theorem 9 summarizes the discussion above:
Theorem 9 Let D be completely exhaustive and |X i | ≥ 2 for all i = 1, . . . , n. A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule p ,γ if and only if all Block-Marschak polynomials K x,A , A ⊂ X, x ∈ X \ A, are non-negative and measure ν derived from these polynomials satisfies Axiom 6.
Characterization for Nets
McFadden [2005] showed that the characterization of random utility models through the BlockMarschak polynomials can be applied not only when D is exhaustive but also when D is just a net. Using his argument, I can generalize Theorems 7, 8 and 9 to nets.
Definition 10 A set of menus D forms a net if
Note that D is exhaustive if it forms a net and it contains each singleton in X.
Suppose D forms a net. Then the Block-Marschak polynomials K x,A are defined if and only if x ∈ X \ A ∈ D and measure ν(S <π B ,x>,X ) can be directly constructed only if X \ B ∈ D (see page 19). McFadden [2005] showed that ν can be extended to the whole set T 0 . However, the extension might not be unique.
Theorem 7 can be generalized as follows:
Theorem 10 Let D form a net. A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule if and only if all Block-Marschak polynomials are non-negative and there exists a measure ν on T 0 derived from these polynomials that satisfies Axiom 5.
To generalize Theorem 8 we need to introduce several definitions.
Definition 11 A set of menus D forms an exclusive net if it forms a net and ∀x, y ∈ X, x y ⇒ x i y i ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Let D be a net. Define
Theorem 11 Let D form an exclusive net. A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule p ,γ if and only if all Block-Marschak polynomials K x,A , A ⊂ X, x ∈ X \ A, are non-negative and |R| ≤ 2 n − 1 where
that is, R is the set of partial orderings that are admissible by Block-Marschak polynomials.
Note that R can be alternatively defined as
Theorem 9 can be generalized as follows:
Theorem 12 Let D form a net and |X i | ≥ 2 for all i = 1, . . . , n. A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule p ,γ if and only if all Block-Marschak polynomials are non-negative and there exist a probability measure ν on Π X derived from these polynomials that satisfies Axiom 6.
6 Regularity, Menu Effects, and Stochastic Intransitivity
This section discusses some properties that are often considered in random choice literature. A good review on various consistency principles placed on random choice models can be found in Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers [2006] .
Section 6.1 focuses on consistency principles that each random criteria rule obeys. In particular, I show that all random criteria rules satisfy regularity condition. This condition implies that the proposed model cannot generate some menu effects that contradict regularity principle.
In contrast, section 6.2 is devoted to consistency principles that some random criteria rule can violate. In particular, I present an example of a random criteria rule that violates weak stochastic transitivity. Moreover, the framework of random criteria rule can reproduce red bus/blue bus example of violation of independence of irrelevant alternatives principle.
Regularity
Regularity principle asserts that the addition of an option to a choice set should never increase the probability of selecting an option from the original set. Formally, Regularity: For any A, B ∈ D such that A ⊂ B: p(a, A) ≥ p(a, B) for any a ∈ A.
Luce and Suppes [1965] showed that all random utility models obey this principle. Since all random criteria rules are random utility models, they also obey it:
Lemma 4 Any random criteria rule satisfies regularity condition.
Alternative proof : This follows from the observation that for any s ∈ P(N), such that a s b for all b ∈ B, {c ∈ A : c s b, ∀b ∈ A} ⊆ {c ∈ B : c s b, ∀b ∈ B}.
However many studies show robust violations of regularity by reporting various consistent patterns in data that are in conflict with regularity property. Two of these patterns attract a lot of attention in literature. The first one is called the attraction effect (Huber and Puto [1983] ) which states that the addition of an option y that is much inferior to a given option x increases the probability of choosing x from the original menu. The other one is called the compromise effect (Simonson [1989] ) which refers to a tendency to choose intermediate options in a given choice set. The compromise effect contradicts regularity since the addition of an option can make another option look intermediate and thus increase the probability to choose it. Neither of these effects can be generated by any random criteria rule. In fact, they cannot be produced by any random utility model.
Recall that the random criteria rule requires an attention function be menu-independent. If we relax this condition then the resulting random criteria rule is no longer a random utility model and can allow for violation of regularity. In particular, it can generate both compromise and attraction effects. A menu-dependent attention function is discussed in Section 7.
Stochastic Intransitivity
For deterministic choice function, transitivity condition defines the set of functions that can be described as utility maximizers. This condition can be generalized to probabilistic choice functions in three different ways, resulting to the notions of strong, moderate, and weak stochastic transitivity. The latter is sometimes considered as the weakest bound on rationality (see Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers [2006] ). It states:
Weak Stochastic Transitivity: For any x, y, z ∈ X, if p(x, {x, y}) ≥ 1/2 and p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2, then p(x, {x, z}) ≥ 1/2.
However, several studies reported empirical evidence of the violation of weak stochastic transitivity in choice data (Tversky [1969] , Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober [2011] ). The following example shows that some random criteria rules can violate this principle.
Example 1 (Violation of Weak Stochastic Transitivity) Take any x, y, z ∈ X such that x i y i z i x i for all i ∈ N. Fix any separable preference order such that two sets, S 1 = {s ∈ P(N) : z s x s y} and S 2 = {s ∈ P(N) : y s z s x}, form a nontrivial partition of P(N), that is S 1 ∪ S 2 = P(N), S 1 ∅, S 2 ∅. Let
Since strong stochastic transitivity implies weak stochastic transitivity, there are random criteria rules that violate strong stochastic transitivity. Luce and Suppes [1965] showed that Luce's independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) principle (Luce [1959] ):
implies strong stochastic transitivity. Therefore, random criteria rule does not obey Luce's IIA.
In particular, my model is perfectly aline with famous red bus/blue bus example originally described in Debreu [1960] . This example illustrates the violation of IIA principle.
Example 2 (Red bus/Blue bus) Let set A be a car (c) and a red bus (r) and set B be the car, the red bus and a blue bus (b). Then the vectors r and b would differ by only one characteristic -color. Suppose that the decision maker does not care about the color, that is b ∼ s r for any s ∈ P(N). Denote S c the set of subsets of criteria according to which the car is better than any of two buses: S c = {s ∈ P(N) : c s b ∼ s r}. Similarly, S rb = {s ∈ P(N) : b ∼ s r s c} and S crb = {s ∈ P(N) : b ∼ s r ∼ s c}. Assume 
Menu-dependent Attention Function
In this section I consider a menu-dependent attention function. Specifically, the central question here is how restrictive the model of random criteria rule with menu-dependent attention functions is.
First, let's define a menu-dependent attention function:
Definition 12 An attention function is a map γ :
Given this new definition of an attention function, a random criteria rule can be redefined as follows:
Definition 13 A random criteria rule is a random choice rule p ,γ for which there exists a pair ( , γ), where is a total order on X that satisfies Assumption 1, and γ is a map γ :
Note that if n = 1, then a random choice rule p is a random criteria rule if and only if there exists a preference relation over X that can rationalize p, that is,
So, for n = 1 this rule is as restrictive as it's menu-independent analog and they both equivalent to a classical utility maximization model.
For the rest of the section assume n ≥ 2.
Consider binary-choice case when D consists of all possible two-elements menus. As before, denote p(x, y) ≡ p(x, {x, y}) for any x, y ∈ X. It's easy to see that for any random criteria rule the following axiom is true: Axiom 7 For any i ∈ N, for any x, y ∈ X, z, v ∈ X i :
, then it must be the case that (z, x −i ) (v, x −i ). Due to separability property, (z, y −i ) (v, y −i ) for any y ∈ X, and therefore (z,
Theorem 13 states that this condition is also sufficient for a random choice rule to be a random criteria rule. Moreover, this condition is also sufficient for a random choice rule to be a random criteria rule with strict preference order . A corollary of this is that any random criteria rule with weak preference order, p ,γ , can be represented as some random criteria rule with strict preference order: p ,γ = p ,γ for some and γ .
Theorem 13 Suppose n ≥ 2 and D = {A ⊆ X | |A| = 2}. A random choice rule p is a random criteria rule p ,γ if and only if it satisfies Axiom 7.
For the proof see Appendix F.
Consider a general case when there is no restriction on D. Obviously, Axiom 7 is still a necessary condition. However, it is not sufficient anymore. For example, suppose there exists A ∈ D such that |A| ≥ 2 n and
Then this is not a random criteria rule. Indeed, suppose it is. Then there exist {s i } 2 n i=1 , s i ∈ P(N), such that a i s i a for all a ∈ A \ {a i }. However, it is impossible since |P(N)| = 2 n − 1. This example leads to the following necessary condition for random choice rule be a random criteria rule with strict preferences:
If p(x, A) p(y, A) for any x, y ∈ A ∈ D, then this condition is also necessary for p be a random criteria rule with weak preferences.
Consider another example that shows that Axioms 7 and 8 are not sufficient for a random choice rule be a random criteria rule. Let n = 2 and
Then both Axioms 7 and 8 satisfy but p cannot be a random criteria rule. Indeed, from (10) and (11) it follows that at most one of three possible preference orderings -1 , 2 , and 12 -places both x and y behind either h, or v, or both of them. But it contradicts (11) which requires at least two such orderings.
Both examples above play with the observation that |P(N)| = 2 n − 1 so that the support of p must be "rationalized" by no more than 2 n − 1 orderings. The following example exploits the dependent structure of preferences { s } s∈P(N) . Take any i ∈ N and let a, b, c ∈ X be such that
Then if p is a random criteria rule, it must be
since a s b and a s c for any s i and a ∼ s b ∼ s c for the rest s.
The full characterization of random criteria rule in general case is left for future research.
Conclusion
Characterizing the individual decision making process is fundamental to solving a wide variety of empirical problems. Although its simplicity is appealing, the classical utility maximization model of individual choice behavior fails to explain many important patterns in data. This paper proposes an extension of the classic model that allows for imperfect attention. In contrast to previous models of imperfect attention, my random criteria rule model exploits the representation of alternatives as a set of attributes. Such representation is very natural in applications where each option is characterized by a common set of criteria and the goal is to estimate the influence of different attributes to the individual decision making process.
I propose several ways to characterize the random criteria rule, that is, to determine whether given data is consistent with a random criteria rule. The characterization for general case is based on a modification of the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preferences that characterizes a random utility model (McFadden and Richter [1990] , McFadden [2005] ). Another characterization uses Block-Marschak polynomials (Falmagne [1978] , Barberá and Pattanaik [1986] ) and is valid only under the assumption that the the set of menus is rich enough. These two characterizations illuminate the connection between the random criteria rule and the random utility model. Finally I also provide a characterization for cases when individuals are restricted to choice over binary sets.
The model has two primitives: a total ordering that represents the decision maker's preferences over the set of all available alternatives, and the attention function that characterizes the probabilities of paying attention to various subsets of criteria. Each of three characterizations corresponds to a particular algorithm for retrieving both the attention function and the preference ordering from choice data. If the algorithm fails to construct a proper attention function and the preference ordering, then the data is inconsistent with the model. The algorithm which is based on the Axiom of Revealed Preferences is applicable for any kind of choice data. However, the other two algorithms are computationally simpler when they can be used.
All three algorithms operate with choice data indirectly through a random choice function. A reliable estimation of this function requires a lot of choice data on the individual level. Data from the market for houses, which I used as an example, might not meet this requirement. But in many situations choices are made sufficiently frequently to get enough data. For example, most grocery stores have quite a lot of information about their customers' purchases and can give the econometrician a long time series of individual choices for a given type of products, such as cereals or candy. In this case both the attention function and the preferences should be recoverable and might be used to give advice to sellers.
The choice rule I present captures only one possible source of deviations from the utility maximization behavior -imperfect attention. Using this rule, this paper demonstrates that imperfect attention alone can explain the violation of weak stochastic transitivity and red bus/blue bus type of menu effects, that are often found in choice data (Tversky [1969] , Debreu [1960] ).
A generalized version of the random criteria rule model that allows the attention function to be menu-dependent is an obvious extension but I leave it for future research. Such models would combine imperfect attention with other phenomena that can explain the deviations from the utility maximization behavior that imperfect attention alone cannot explain. For example, a random criteria choice model with the attention function that depends on some reference point inferred from a given menu, can reproduce the famous compromise and attraction effects (Simonson [1989] ). The development of such models would allow us to analyze choice data that are inconsistent with the menu-independent attention functions. using the classical identity n k=0 (−1) k n k = 0 (e.g., Feller [1968] , p.63).
Given Def.4, it is sufficient to prove that for any x, y ∈ X p(x, y) − p(y, 
I'll use induction by the number of different characteristics, k = |{i : x i y i }|.
Suppose k = 1 and x i y i . Then by condition (2), p(x, y) − p(y, x) = a({i}) (1 (x y) − 1 (y x)) .
Since x −i = y −i , i = . Using (12), I get (13).
Fix any 1 < k ≤ n. Suppose (13) is true for any x, y ∈ X such that |{i : x i y i }| < k. Then by Axioms 1 and 2, for any x, y ∈ X such that |s * ≡ {i : x i y i }| = k, By lemma 1, γ(s) = γ (s) for all s ∈ P(N) if and only if a(s) = a (s) for all s ∈ P(N). Thus, to prove condition (I), it is sufficient to show that a(s) = a (s) for all s ∈ P(N).
Fix any s * ∈ P(N). Applying Axiom 2, condition (2) tox,ỹ, we get a(s * ):
Similarly, for a (s * ). Note that the denominator does not equal to zero since the number of summands is 2 |s * | − 1, the odd number for any s * , and each summand is either 1 or -1. Using (i) and (ii), we get (I).
To prove (II), fix any x, y ∈ X. By (iii) and (I), a(s) > 0 for any s ∈ P(N). Condition (2) for x and y gives: 
Appendix F Proof of Theorem 13
Necessity is trivial. Let's prove sufficiency. Suppose p is a random choice rule that satisfies Axiom 7.
For every i ∈ N, denote P i the set of pairs (z, v), z, v ∈ X i such that p((z, x −i ), (v, x −i )) > p((v, x −i ), (z, x −i )) for some x ∈ X. Due to Axiom 7, P i is an asymmetric binary relation. Note also that if (z, v) ∈ P i and (v, w) ∈ P i then (w, z) P i . Make P i complete, transitive and asymmetric:
(1) for all z, v, w ∈ X i : if (z, v) ∈ P i and (v, w) ∈ P i let (z, w) ∈ P i , (2) if P i is not complete, take any z, v ∈ X i such that neither (z, v) ∈ P i nor (v, z) ∈ P i and let (z, v) ∈ P i ; then go to step (1).
Define (z, y −i ) (v, y −i ) for all y ∈ X and all (z, v) ∈ P i .
For any i ∈ N, z, v ∈ X i , y ∈ X, define Next, for any i < j ∈ N, define P i j = {(vw, zr) ∈ (X i × X j ) 2 | (z, v) ∈ P i , (r, w) ∈ P j }. Define (v, w, y −{i, j} ) (z, r, y −{i, j} ) for all y ∈ X, (vw, zr) ∈ P i j . Note that P i j is transitive and asymmetric.
For any x, y ∈ X such that there exist i < j ∈ N such that x i y i and x j y j , consider p(x, y) and p(y, x). WLOG, (x i , y i ) ∈ P i . Case 1 : (x i , y i ) ∈ P i and (x j , y j ) ∈ P j . Then (y i j , x i j ) ∈ P i j . Define s + (x, y) = {i} and s − (x, y) = {i, j} Case 2 : (x i , y i ) ∈ P i and (y j , x j ) ∈ P j . Define s + (x, y) = {i} and s − (x, y) = { j} Let γ(s + , {x, y}) = (p(x, y) − p(y, x))1 (p(x, y) > p(y, x)) + 1 2 (1 − |p(x, y) − p(y, x)|) γ(s − , {x, y}) = (p(y, x) − p(x, y))1 (p(x, y) < p(y, x)) + 1 2 (1 − |p(x, y) − p(y, x)|)
